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Abstract
Habit formation is a xture of contemporary new-Keynesian models. The vast major-
ity assume that agents form habits strictly over consumption of an aggregate good,
leaving open the question of whether it might be preferable to have them form habits
over dierentiated products instead{an arrangement known as deep habits. I answer
this question by estimating a model that nests both habit concepts as special cases.
Estimates reveal that the data favor a specication in which consumption habits are
stronger at the product level than at the aggregate level. A mix of signicance tests
and simulation results indicate that including deep habits greatly improves model t,
most notably with regard to ination dynamics.
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1 Introduction
Habit formation in consumption is a prominent feature of the microeconomic apparatus that
underlies modern new-Keynesian models of the business cycle (e.g., Fuhrer, 2000; Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Evans, 2005; Smets and Wouters, 2007). A standard assumption in this
class of models is that households derive utility by consuming an aggregate good that is
comprised of numerous dierentiated products. A basic question then is whether habits
develop at the level of the aggregate good or at the level of individual good varieties. Until
recently this literature has only considered cases where agents become addicted to the overall
consumption bundle despite empirical evidence suggesting that shoppers form habits over
product categories and even specic brands (e.g., Chintagunta, Kyriazidou, and Perktold,
2001). Motivated by these ndings, Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (2006) propose a \deep
habits" model in which habitual consumption develops exclusively on a good-by-good basis.
In such an environment the demand function for each product will depend on past sales,
causing equilibrium mark-ups of price over marginal cost to be time-varying and to move
countercyclically with output.1 The authors go on to show that by inducing countercyclical
mark-up behavior, deep habits can account for the observed procyclical responses of both
consumption and real wages to various demand shocks. In contrast, a traditional habit-
persistence model employing the exact same calibration fails to capture this dynamic.
The comparisons between deep and aggregate habit formation made in Ravn et al. (2006)
take place in an economy with purely exible product prices. As a result, the model is limited
in its ability to match the broad correlations among nominal and real variables that dene
postwar US business cycles. New-Keynesian models, on the other hand, are better suited
to this task (e.g., Ireland, 2003). A relevant question then is whether incorporating deep
habits into these models could improve their t with the data when compared to standard
versions that assume habits thrive only at the composite good level. I try to answer that
question here by estimating a small-scale DSGE model with sticky product prices, which
I then use as a laboratory for testing the implications of the two habit concepts described
above. The main goal is to examine whether aggregate habits are sucient to explain the
observed correlations in an economy where nominal frictions play a leading role, or whether
deep habits can account for additional features of the data, thereby strengthening model t.
To assess the merits of deep vs. aggregate habit formation, the paper begins by presenting
a simple new-Keynesian model whose preference structure nests both types as special cases.
1Both observations are consistent with the predominant empirical ndings on the cyclical properties of
mark-ups in US data (e.g., Bils, 1987; Rotemberg and Woodford, 1999).
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The advantage of employing a nested utility function is that it enables one to consider several
dierent modeling choices in the course of estimation. These include cases in which only
the composite good is habit forming, only the individual goods are habit forming, both are
addictive with possibly dierent habit intensities, or neither. Estimating a model that can
accommodate any one of these arrangements makes it easier to infer from the data which
mode of habit persistence is the more empirically compelling.
The paper proceeds by estimating three versions of the model using a maximum-likelihood
procedure with quarterly US data on consumption, ination, and a nominal interest rate.
Each estimation imposes dierent restrictions on the utility function. One leaves the prefer-
ence parameters unconstrained, allowing the data to ascertain the strength of habit formation
at both levels. The second permits deep habit formation but sets aggregate habit intensity
equal to zero prior to estimation. The third restricts deep habit intensity to zero while leav-
ing the aggregate parameter free. Likelihood ratio tests then provide a basis for comparing
the t of the two constrained models to an unrestricted alternative that allows both types of
consumption habits to coexist. Estimates reveal that the data favor a model featuring a large
amount of persistence at the level of individual goods along with a modest amount at the
composite good level. When examined side-by-side, however, it is clear that deep habits do a
better job of explaining the broad correlations embodied by the likelihood function. In fact,
the exclusion restriction on aggregate habits is not easily rejected at standard signicance
levels, but it is rejected with a high degree of condence when imposed on deep habits.
Likelihood comparisons, while useful for assessing model t, are uninformative about the
precise features of the data captured by deep habits but not by aggregate habits. Further
complicating this analysis is the fact that point estimates change from one model variant
to the next, making it dicult to distinguish the empirical eects of habit formation from
the eects of changes in the parameter values. To isolate the role of the habit mechanism
from these other elements, I compare simulations of the restricted model containing only
deep habits to those from an identically-parameterized model with deep habits replaced
by aggregate habits. Simulations reveal that deep habits are superior mainly because they
impart greater persistence on the ination process. Correlations between current and lagged
ination, for example, decay more slowly when habits are deeply rooted and are much closer
to the sample correlations. This dynamic is also reected in the model's impulse response
functions, which show ination reacting more sluggishly to both demand and supply shocks.
To gain insight into the persistence mechanism, it is helpful to examine how the shadow
value of sales for individual producers responds to economic shocks. This quantity, repre-
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sented by the lagrange multiplier on the rm's product demand function, turns out to be
much less volatile under deep habits. Smaller uctuations in the marginal value of sales
motivate rms to smooth out their price adjustments over a longer horizon, imparting more
inertia on the dynamics of aggregate ination. This characteristic of the deep habits model
derives from price-elasticity and intertemporal eects found by Ravn et al. (2006) to be
the source of countercyclical mark-ups under exible prices. With deep habits an increase
in aggregate spending boosts the demand elasticity for each product, causing equilibrium
mark-ups to fall. At the same time, rms recognize that consumption habits make future de-
mand conditions dependent on current sales, creating an (intertemporal) incentive to squeeze
prices further in an eort to expand future prots. Of course, most new-Keynesian models
generate countercyclical mark-ups by virtue of nominal stickiness alone. Nevertheless, these
two eects, which vanish under aggregate habits, help discourage the swift price increases
that would otherwise follow expansionary demand shocks as well as the abrupt declines that
typically follow shocks to total factor productivity.
1.1 Related Studies
This paper contributes to a recent literature, originated by Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe
(2004), that studies the empirical implications of incorporating deep habits into sticky-price
models of the business cycle. Using generalized method of moments, Lubik and Teo (2011)
estimate a new-Keynesian Phillips curve derived from an optimizing model featuring deep
habit preferences. In their setup the forcing process for ination depends on expected future
consumption growth in addition to real marginal cost. The authors construct a synthetic
time series for this process using real unit labor cost along with conditional expectations
obtained from a reduced-form forecasting model for consumption. A central nding is that
deep habits improve the t of the Phillips curve while making it less reliant on backward-
looking components such as indexation or rule-of-thumb pricing.
One of the drawbacks of the single-equation estimation strategy employed by Lubik and
Teo (2011) is that it does not account for all of the general equilibrium restrictions on the
joint dynamics of the endogenous variables. By contrast, the maximum-likelihood approach
adopted here imposes all of these restrictions by estimating simultaneously the full system
of equilibrium dierence equations contained in the model. In eorts to compare the t
of deep habits to aggregate habits, a systems-based approach is useful because the two
specications have dierent testable implications for the co-movement of the endogenous
variables. Despite these methodological dierences, it is encouraging that the studies report
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some common ndings, most notably regarding point estimates of the deep habit parameter,
improvements in model t, and lagged indexation as a trivial source of ination persistence.
Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe, Uribe, and Uuskula (2010) is an example of a recent study that
utilizes a complete model for estimation. A key dierence from this paper, however, is
that parameters are chosen by minimizing a weighted discrepancy between the dynamic
responses to a monetary policy shock implied by the model and the empirical ones obtained
from a structural vector autoregression. Statistical inference is therefore based on limited
information contained in the impulse responses to a single identied shock rather than full
information provided by the likelihood function. The authors show that deep habits can
resolve the so-called \price puzzle" (the brief deation that follows an expansionary monetary
shock) as well as generate the observed persistence in the ination response without relying
on implausible levels of exogenous nominal rigidity. An alternative model featuring aggregate
habits instead of deep habits is shown to perform worse in these specic areas.
2 The Model
The economy is inhabited by identical households and a continuum of imperfectly competitive
rms that produce dierentiated goods and face costs of changing prices. What sets it apart
from the textbook new-Keynesian model is a preference structure that allows consumption
habits to be formed at the level of dierentiated goods as well as the composite nal good.
2.1 Households
Households are indexed by j 2 [0; 1]. Each household j values consumption of dierentiated
goods cj;t(i), with distinct varieties indexed by i 2 [0; 1], but experiences disutility from sup-
plying labor hj;t. Following Ravn et al. (2006), preferences feature external habit formation
on a good-by-good basis. This so-called \deep habits" specication assumes that household
j's period utility function depends on a composite good xj;t given by
xj;t =
Z 1
0
 
cj;t(i)  bdct 1(i)
1 1=
di
1=(1 1=)
; (1)
where ct 1(i) 
R 1
0
cj;t 1(i)dj denotes the population mean consumption of good i at date
t   1 and  > 1 is the substitution elasticity across (habit-adjusted) varieties. Parameter
bd 2 [0; 1) measures the intensity of habit formation in consumption of each variety.
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Before making intertemporal decisions, household j minimizes total consumption expen-
diture,
R 1
0
Pt(i)cj;t(i)di, subject to the aggregation constraint (1). Pt(i) is the nominal price
of good i at date t. In solving its minimization problem, the household treats ct 1(i) as
exogenous.2 The rst-order conditions imply demand functions for each variety of the form
cj;t(i) =

Pt(i)
Pt
 
xj;t + b
dct 1(i);
where Pt 
hR 1
0
Pt(i)
1 di
i1=(1 )
is the unit price of the nal good. The demand for good i
has the usual property of being negatively related to its relative price Pt(i)=Pt and positively
related to consumption of the nal good xj;t. Note, however, that deep habits give rise to an
additional component that depends positively on past aggregate sales ct 1(i) when bd > 0.
As shown in the next section, rms internalize this feature when setting prices. In particular,
they recognize that consumption habits make future demand conditions a function of the
current sales volume. This complementarity creates an incentive to moderate price increases
in order to expand the customer base and hence procure higher prots in subsequent periods.
Household j maximizes the expected lifetime utility function
Vj;0 = E0
1X
t=0
tat
"
log(xj;t   baxt 1) 
h1+j;t
1 + 
#
; (2)
where E0 is a date-0 conditional expectations operator,  2 (0; 1) is a subjective discount
factor, and 1= > 0 is the Frisch elasticity of labor supply. Preference shocks at follow the
autoregressive process log at = a log at 1 + "a;t, with a 2 ( 1; 1) and "a;t  i.i.d. N(0; 2a).
Movements in at shift the marginal utility of nal consumption as well as the marginal disu-
tility of labor. In equilibrium these disturbances perturb the consumption Euler equation.
In addition to dierentiated goods cj;t(i), the preferences described in (2) permit house-
holds to form habits directly over the composite good xj;t. Specically, household j values
quasi dierences between xj;t and xt 1 
R 1
0
xj;t 1dj, the population average consumption of
the composite good at date t   1. Following Abel (1990), xt 1 is perceived as an external
reference variable in that its evolution is taken as exogenous during optimization. Parameter
ba 2 [0; 1) measures the strength of external habits in consumption of the nal good.3
2Nakamura and Steinsson (2011) provide an example in which households internalize past consumption
demand for each variety when allocating expenditure on individual goods.
3This specication, often referred to as \catching up with the Joneses," is dierent from internal habit
formation in which households value consumption relative to their own past consumption. Dennis (2009)
studies the empirical consequences of internal vs. external habit formation from a new-Keynesian perspective.
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The utility function in (2) is appealing because it nests both forms of habit persistence
examined in this paper as special cases. When ba = 0 preferences become time separable
in xj;t, and the model collapses to a strictly deep habits specication. Alternatively, setting
bd = 0 causes the deep habits mechanism in (1) to vanish. In this case habits develop only at
the level of the nal good now given by
hR 1
0
cj;t(i)
1 1=di
i1=(1 1=)
, which is just a standard
Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator commonly used in models with imperfectly competitive markets.
Henceforth, I refer to this restricted version as the \aggregate habits" specication.
In each period t  0, household j supplies labor to rms at a competitive nominal wage
rate Wt. It also has access to riskless one-period bonds Bj;t that pay a gross nominal interest
rate Rt at date t+1. Together with bond wealth and labor income, household j receives an
aliquot share of prots from ownership of rms, j;t. The ow budget constraint is
Ptxj;t +$t +Bj;t  Rt 1Bj;t 1 +Wthj;t + j;t; (3)
where $t  bd
R 1
0
Pt(i)ct 1(i)di.4 Sequences fxj;t; hj;t; Bj;tg1t=0 are chosen to maximize Vj;0
subject to (3) and a borrowing limit that rules out Ponzi schemes. In evaluating its optimal
sequence problem, the household takes as given fPt; $t; Rt;Wt;j;tg1t=0 as well as the initial
composite good x 1 and bond holdings Bj; 1. The rst-order necessary conditions imply
hj;t (xj;t   baxt 1) = wt (4)
and
1 = Et
Rt
t+1
at+1 (xj;t   baxt 1)
at (xj;t+1   baxt) ; (5)
where wt  Wt=Pt is the real wage and t  Pt=Pt 1 is the gross ination rate.
2.2 Firms
Consumption goods are produced by a continuum of monopolistically competitive rms.
Each variety i is associated with a distinct rm and is manufactured using household labor
according to the production function yt(i) = ztht(i), where yt(i) denotes the output of rm i
and ht(i) is its labor input. Aggregate technology shocks zt follow the autoregressive process
log zt = (1  z) log z + z log zt 1 + "z;t, with z 2 [0; 1), z > 0, and "z;t  i.i.d. N(0; 2z).
Firm i selects its price Pt(i) to maximize the present discounted value of nominal prots.
4Household j's eorts to minimize the period-by-period cost of assembling each unit of xj;t implies that,
at the optimum,
R 1
0
Pt(i)cj;t(i)di = Ptxj;t + b
d
R 1
0
Pt(i)ct 1(i)di.
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Constraining the rm's price-setting decision is the market demand curve for good i
ct(i) =

Pt(i)
Pt
 
xt + b
dct 1(i); (6)
obtained by integrating cj;t(i) over all j 2 [0; 1] households. Here it is understood that rm
i will always meet this demand at the posted price, implying that ztht(i)  ct(i) for all
t  0. Following Rotemberg (1982), rms also face a quadratic cost of adjusting nominal
prices of the form (=2) (Pt(i)=Pt 1(i)  1)2 yt, where   0 measures the degree of price
rigidity. Adjustment costs are expressed in units of aggregate output, yt 
R 1
0
yt(i)di, and
are incurred whenever growth in Pt(i) deviates from the long-run mean ination rate .
The Lagrangian of rm i's problem can be written as
L = E0
1X
t=0
q0;t
(
Pt(i)ct(i) Wtht(i)  Pt
2

Pt(i)
Pt 1(i)
  1
2
yt
+Ptt(i) [ztht(i)  ct(i)] + Ptt(i)
"
Pt(i)
Pt
 
xt + b
dct 1(i)  ct(i)
#)
;
where q0;t is a stochastic discount factor determining the date-0 value of additional prots in
period t.5 In maximizing L, rm i takes as given fq0;t;Wt; Pt; yt; zt; xtg1t=0 as well as initial
sales c 1(i) and price P 1(i). First-order conditions with respect to fht(i); ct(i); Pt(i)g1t=0 are
wt = t(i)zt; (7)
t(i) =
Pt(i)
Pt
  t(i) + bdEt q0;t+1
q0;t
t+1t+1(i); (8)
ct(i) = t(i)

Pt(i)
Pt
  1
xt + 

Pt(i)
Pt 1(i)
  1

Ptyt
Pt 1(i)
  Et q0;t+1
q0;t
t+1

Pt+1(i)
Pt(i)
  1

Pt+1(i)Ptyt+1
Pt(i)2
: (9)
The multiplier t(i) in (7) corresponds to real marginal cost. With a linear technology,
marginal cost is invariant across rms and equal to the ratio of the real wage to the marginal
product of labor. The multiplier t(i) in (8) can be interpreted as the shadow value of selling
an additional unit of good i in the current period. It is the sum of two parts; the rst is
5In equilibrium the stochastic discount factor satises q0;tPt = 
tat=(xt   baxt 1).
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the short-run prot from the sale, Pt(i)=Pt   t(i), and the second is the discounted value
of all future prots that the sale is expected to generate, bdEt
q0;t+1
q0;t
t+1t+1(i).
6 Equation
(9) describes conditions that must be satised by the rm's optimal price. Specically, the
marginal revenue from a unit increase in relative price, ct(i), must equal the marginal loss
resulting from the fall in demand, t(i)

Pt(i)
Pt
  1
xt, plus an adjustment cost when  > 0.
2.3 Monetary Policy
Following Ravn et al. (2010), the monetary authority sets Rt according to a Taylor rule
log(Rt=R) = r log(Rt 1=R) + (1  r) [ log(t=) + y log(yt=y)] + "r;t;
where  and y capture the long-run policy response to uctuations in gross ination and
aggregate output. Parameter r 2 [0; 1) measures the degree of interest rate smoothing.7 Pos-
itive constants R, , and y denote the steady-state values of the nominal interest rate, ina-
tion, and output. The purely random element of policy is summarized by "r;t  i.i.d.N(0; 2r).
2.4 Competitive Equilibrium
I consider a symmetric competitive equilibrium in which all households make identical con-
sumption and labor supply decisions and all rms charge the same price. It follows that
the subscript j and the function argument i can be dropped from variables appearing in the
household's and rm's optimality conditions.
Equilibrium requires that both labor and product markets clear at prevailing prices. This
is accomplished in the labor market by imposingZ 1
0
hj;tdj =
Z 1
0
ht(i)di  ht
for t  0. In product markets, output of the nal good must be allocated to total consump-
tion expenditure and to resource costs originating from the adjustment of prices:
yt = ct +

2
t

  1
2
yt:
6Due to habit formation, selling a unit of good i in the current period raises sales by bd units in the
following period, the present discounted value of which equals bdEt
q0;t+1
q0;t
t+1t+1(i).
7The policy coecients fr; ; yg are jointly restricted to guarantee a locally unique rational expec-
tations equilibrium. See Zubairy (2012) for a discussion of how deep habits modify the local determinacy
conditions of an otherwise standard new-Keynesian model.
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3 Econometric Strategy
In the absence of shocks, the equilibrium conditions of the model imply that all prices and
quantities converge to a unique steady state. I log-linearize each equation around this xed
point and compute a rational expectations equilibrium using methods developed by Klein
(2000). The solution has a state-space representation given by
st = st 1 +
"t; (10)
ft = Ust; (11)
where vector st contains both exogenous and endogenous state variables, "t holds the guas-
sian innovations, and vector ft contains the model's forward-looking variables. Elements of
matrices , 
, and U are functions of the structural parameters governing the preferences
and technologies of households, rms, and the monetary authority.
As shown by Kim (2000), models with solutions of the form (10) and (11) can be estimated
via maximum likelihood using standard Kalman ltering techniques (e.g., Harvey, 1989).
With data on the observable variables, the Kalman lter compiles a history of innovations
f"tgTt=1 that are used to evaluate sample log likelihood. Since these innovations depend on
, 
, and U, structural parameters may be estimated by maximizing log likelihood.
I estimate the model with quarterly US data on consumption, ination, and a nominal
interest rate. The sample period is 1965:Q3 to 2012:Q1. Consumption is real personal con-
sumption expenditures (PCE) divided by the civilian noninstitutional population. Ination
is the rst-dierenced log of the PCE (chain-type) price index. The interest rate is the log of
the gross yield on three-month Treasury bills. To harmonize the data with the model, I de-
mean the ination and interest rate series prior to estimation. Consumption data, however,
exhibits a secular trend. To induce stationarity I regress the log of per capita consumption
against a constant and a linear time trend. Least squares residuals are used for estimation.
4 Estimation Results
Of the model's fourteen parameters, three are held xed prior to estimation. The discount
factor  is set to 0.9965, which equals the ratio of the sample means of ination and the
nominal interest rate. The substitution elasticity  across (habit-adjusted) goods is set equal
to 6. In the absence of deep habits (bd = 0), this value implies an average mark-up of 20
percent and is consistent with the evidence in Basu and Fernald (1997). When deep habits
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are present, the steady-state mark-up is given by  
h
1  (1=)

1 bd
1 bd
i 1
and depends
on both  and bd. Point estimates of bd discussed below put  in the 21-22 percent range.
Preliminary attempts to estimate the adjustment cost parameter  returned values that
point to extreme levels of price rigidity. As a result, I follow Monacelli (2009) by calibrating
 so that the model is consistent with a price-change frequency of one year in a Calvo-Yun
framework. Letting 1    denote the Calvo reset probability,  = 0:75 implies an average
contract duration of (1   ) 1 = 4 quarters (e.g., Woodford, 2003). To obtain , I set the
key slope coecient in the linearized version of (9), which turns out to be (   1)=, equal
to the Phillips curve slope in the standard Calvo-Yun model given by (1   )(1   )=.
This restriction implies that the adjustment cost term satises  = (  1)=(1 )(1 )
for xed values of , , and . Price contracts lasting one year are common in the new-
Keynesian literature and are compatible with recent micro-level evidence on the volatility of
consumer goods prices (e.g., Nakamura and Steinsson, 2008).
Table 1 displays maximum-likelihood estimates and standard errors for the nested habits
model as well as the two restricted models that consider deep and aggregate habits separately.
Standard errors correspond to the square roots of the diagonals of the inverse Hessian matrix.
Looking rst at the nested model, point estimates of ba and bd reveal that the data favor
a specication in which consumption habits are strongest at the level of individual goods.
The estimate of bd is 0.94 and is close to the value of 0.85 reported by Lubik and Teo (2011)
and Ravn et al. (2010). The estimate of ba, on the other hand, is only 0.61, which is near the
range of estimates in Christiano et al. (2005) (0.65) and Smets and Wouters (2007) (0.71).
Finally, notice that the standard error associated with bd is an order of magnitude smaller
than the one for ba, indicating far more precision in the estimate of deep habits.8
Concerning the Taylor rule parameters, the estimate of r is high (0.90), reecting the
Federal Reserve's penchant for adjusting the interest rate gradually in response to shocks.
The estimate of , measuring the long-run policy response to ination, is 1.54. This value
ensures that policy is stabilizing and satises the Taylor principle over the sample period.
By contrast, policy does not appear to have reacted strongly to uctuations in output. The
estimate of y is low (0.07) and not signicantly dierent from zero. Other studies that
report small estimates of y in US data include Ireland (2003) and Ravn et al. (2010).
Turning next to the shocks, estimates of a, z, and r indicate that innovations to
preference shocks are more volatile than technology and monetary policy innovations. More-
8Using nondurable consumption data in a model that also accounts for investment dynamics and govern-
ment spending, Ravn et al. (2004) obtain estimates of bd spanning 0.93 to 0.95.
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over, estimates of a ( 0:30) and z (0.93) suggest that while technology shocks are highly
persistent, preference shocks are not persistent and may even be negatively autocorrelated.9
The lack of persistence and high volatility surrounding preference shocks is somewhat
atypical of most DSGE models. To provide some intuition for why it appears in the present
model, I consider a log-linear approximation of the consumption Euler equation (5) given by
c^t =

ba + bd + babd
1 + ba + bd

c^t 1  

babd
1 + ba + bd

c^t 2 +

1
1 + ba + bd

Etc^t+1 (12)
 

(1  ba)(1  bd)
1 + ba + bd

R^t   Et^t+1   (1  a)a^t

;
where X^t  logXt   logX denotes the log deviation of a variable Xt from steady state X.
It is clear that positive values of ba and bd lower the impact eect of a given realization of
a^t on consumption c^t. Explaining the historical variation in US consumption data therefore
requires larger innovations to the preference shock, all else equal, than would be necessary in
the absence of deep or aggregate habit formation (see below). The autocorrelation coecient
a plays a similar role in the transmission of preference shocks, but its estimate is also likely
being inuenced by the presence of two consumption lags in the Euler equation. When either
habit type is dropped from the utility function (bd = 0 or ba = 0), the second lag vanishes,
forcing the model to rely more heavily on persistent shocks rather than its own internal
structure to replicate the time-series properties of aggregate consumption (see below).
Estimates of the deep habits model are obtained by maximizing log likelihood under
the restriction ba = 0. The contribution that aggregate habits make to the overall t of
the model can be tested by comparing these results to the nested specication. Imposing
ba = 0 evidently has little eect on the majority of parameter estimates, most notably the
degree of deep habits bd, which is nearly unchanged at 0.94. Obvious exceptions are the
persistence and volatility of preference shocks. For reasons discussed above, the estimate
of a falls by over half (0.12) while the estimate of a becomes signicantly positive (0.50).
Omitting aggregate habits also lowers maximized log likelihood from 2380.41 to 2377.65. To
see whether this decline is statistically signicant, I perform a likelihood ratio test of the null
hypothesis that ba = 0. The p-value of the relevant chi-square statistic is 0.0189, implying
that the exclusion restriction is rejected by the data at the 5% level but not the 1% level.
To evaluate the contribution of deep habits to model t, I also report estimates from
the aggregate habits model obtained by restricting bd = 0. Eliminating deep habits does
9The chi-square statistic from a likelihood ratio test of the hypothesis a = 0 has a p-value of 0.0084.
11
not greatly aect estimates of ba (0.65), but it has a big impact on how one interprets the
preference shocks. Estimates of a (0.95) and a (0.02) suggest that they are highly persistent
but not signicantly more volatile than technology shocks over the sample period. Along
with these parameter changes, the maximized value of log likelihood drops all the way to
2343.57. The p-value for the likelihood ratio test of bd = 0 is less than 0.0001. Thus compared
to previous results concerning aggregate habit formation, the new-Keynesian model suers
a greater loss of explanatory power when deep habits are excluded.
5 Examining the Role of Deep Habits
Although evidence based on the likelihood function points to deep habits as the more em-
pirically compelling, it is unclear precisely which aspects of the data are responsible for the
improvement in model t. To answer this question and gain further insight into the role of
consumption habits per se, I compare simulations of the deep habits model estimated in the
previous section to those from an aggregate habits model that uses the exact same parame-
ter values (i.e., ba = bd = 0:9414). The ensuing dierences in model dynamics are therefore
driven entirely by the habit mechanism and not by variation in the parameter estimates.
5.1 Volatilities and Correlations
In Table 2 and Fig. 1 I report standard deviations and autocorrelation functions for the ob-
servable variables{detrended consumption, ination, and the nominal interest rate{generated
from the deep habits model as well as an identically-parameterized aggregate habits model.
To see which one has superior business cycle properties, I also report the corresponding set
of moments observed in the US data. Following Fuhrer (2000), moments from the data are
computed on the basis of an unrestricted, fourth-order vector autoregression.
The deep habits model does a better job of accounting for the joint volatility of c^t, ^t, and
R^t. For each variable the model-implied standard deviation is well-within the 90% condence
interval around the VAR-based estimate, so dierences between the two are insignicant at
the 10% level. This is not true of the aggregate habits model, which tends to understate con-
sumption volatility but greatly overstate ination volatility. In fact, the standard deviation
of ^t under aggregate habits is more than double the value obtained under deep habits.
Fig. 1 reveals that deep habits are also better at replicating some of the key dynamic
interactions reected in the autocorrelation functions. Nowhere is this more obvious than in
the own correlation of ination. The VAR results show ination to be highly persistent with
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a correlation \half-life" of about seven quarters. Under deep habits the correlation between
ination and its own lag still exceeds 0.50 after one year and stays positive for up to three
years. By contrast, there is almost no ination persistence under aggregate habits. The
correlation half-life is less than one quarter and turns slightly negative after just one year.
Another feature of the correlogram best captured by deep habits is the persistence in
the own correlation of the nominal interest rate and its cross correlation with ination at
both leads and lags. In each case the autocorrelations are generally inside the VAR's 90%
condence bands for the deep habits model but not for the aggregate habits model. These
ndings, however, may simply reect the policymaker's xed response in the Taylor rule to
a more persistent ination process under deep habits. The other correlations reported in the
gure are similar for both models and are broadly consistent with the data.10
5.2 Impulse Response Analysis
What factors drive the persistence and volatility of ination observed under deep habits? To
shed light on the key mechanisms, I now characterize quantitatively the dynamic responses
of the economy to demand and supply shocks. Specically, in Figs. 2 and 3 I report impulse
responses to a one-standard-deviation increase in the preference shock at and the technology
shock zt (both in logs). The path of the estimated deep habits model is depicted with a solid
line and, for comparison, the aggregate habits model is shown with a dotted line.
Absent from this discussion are the responses to a policy innovation "r;t. Because they
originate on the demand side of the model, monetary shocks produce short-run dynamics that
are qualitatively similar to preference shocks. Moreover, Ravn et al. (2010) only consider
monetary shocks in their analysis of deep habits. Emphasizing preference and technology
shocks therefore shifts the orientation of this paper towards ndings that have not received as
much attention in the literature. Finally, variance decompositions of the two models reported
in Table 3 indicate that policy shocks have a small impact on c^t, ^t, and R^t. Preference and
technology shocks, by contrast, account for over 90% of the variability in most cases.
Consider the eects of a preference shock in Fig. 2. A positive innovation to at lifts con-
sumption in both models because it increases households' marginal utility of habit-adjusted
10Condence intervals for the autocovariance functions are obtained using Monte Carlo methods as follows.
First, I take the joint distribution of the VAR coecient estimates and the residual covariance matrix to
be asymptotically normal with mean given by the sample estimates and covariance given by the sample
covariance matrix of those estimates. Second, I draw 10,000 random vectors from this multivariate normal
distribution and compute the corresponding autocovariance functions for each draw. Third, I rank the
autocovariances for each variable pair and for each lag in descending order. The 90% condence intervals
are bounded by the 5th and 95th percentiles of the ordered autocovariances.
13
consumption. Meanwhile, the shock also boosts the demand for labor as rms try to satisfy
the temporary consumption boom. This raises equilibrium work hours and the real wage
along a xed labor supply curve since preference shocks do not aect households' marginal
rate of substitution in (4). With productivity zt unchanged, the wage increase implies an
equal percentage increase in real marginal cost given by the lagrange multiplier t in (7).
The adjustment paths described so far are similar for the two habit specications. Where
they depart is in the response of the shadow value of sales. Recall that this quantity,
represented by the multiplier t on the consumer demand function, measures the value to
the rm of selling an extra unit in the current period. According to the gure, it falls sharply
on impact under aggregate habits{by about 53%{compared to only 5% under deep habits.
The manner in which consumption habits aect the shadow value of sales can be seen
more clearly by expressing t in terms of the present value of expected future per-unit prots.
Iterating (8) forward and imposing the various symmetric equilibrium conditions yields
t = Et
1X
j=0
 
bd
j t+j
t
(1  t+j) ; (13)
where t is the date-t marginal utility of habit-adjusted consumption. Two observations are
worth noting. First, when bd is close to one, t depends heavily on expectations of per-unit
prots in the distant future. Because the shocks are transitory, long-run prot forecasts do
not deviate much from the steady state. Consequently, even large changes in marginal cost
over the short run have only a small percentage eect on the entire present value expression.
Second, when bd = 0, as is true of the aggregate habits model, (13) collapses to t = 1  t.
The value of selling an additional unit in this case is just the current-period marginal prot
since the sale is not expected to induce future sales when deep habits are absent. It follows
that large shifts in real marginal cost will have a comparable percentage eect on t.
Returning to Fig. 1, movements in the value of sales strongly inuence how rms react to
the increase in marginal cost. With aggregate habits, the large drop in t motivates rms to
pass these cost increases on to consumers via higher prices. As a result, annualized ination
surges to 9.4% on impact and recedes quickly as the eects on marginal cost subside. With
deep habits, the small decline in t encourages rms to shield their customers from higher
costs by keeping prices low. In this case ination actually falls slightly below the steady
state in the initial period but rises gently to a peak of 4.3% three quarters later.
The reason why the shadow value of sales is more rigid and thus ination less volatile
and more persistent under deep habits is partly due to the intertemporal eect identied
14
by Ravn et al. (2006). This eect emerges because rms recognize that current sales aect
future consumption demand if bd > 0. When faced with rising demand and cost conditions,
rms have a powerful incentive to broaden their market share by holding down prices. The
resulting growth in the habit stock enables rms to smooth out price increases over several
quarters rather than front-load all of them as seen in the aggregate habits model.
The other channel through which deep habits aect ination dynamics is the price-
elasticity eect. As explained by Ravn et al. (2006), shocks that lift aggregate spending
increase the relative size of the price-elastic component of the rm's demand schedule (6)
when bd > 0. This raises the short-run price elasticity of demand, which in a symmetric
equilibrium can be expressed as t  (1 bdct 1=ct).11 Following an expansionary preference
shock, rms will therefore seek to limit any price increase in an eort to preserve market
share. The same incentives do not exist in the aggregate habits model. When bd = 0 the
demand elasticity is constant and equal to  regardless of the spending level. Fig. 1 arms
this result. Under deep habits t climbs by 10.7% on impact. This drives mark-ups even
lower and bolsters the inertia already present in ination from the intertemporal eect.
The joint impact that these two channels have on the ination process is also evident
in the optimal price-setting condition (9) when expressed in log-linear form. The relevant
steady-state approximation produces a forward-looking Phillips curve
^t = Et^t+1 + (1=) (c^t   ^t   x^t) : (14)
Solving (14) forward and recognizing that x^t =
 
c^t   bdc^t 1

=(1  bd) gives
^t =  (1=)Et
1X
j=0
j
0B@^t+j +  bd=(1  bd) (c^t+j   c^t+j 1)| {z }
^t+j
1CA ; (15)
revealing ination to be solely a function of the expected future paths of consumption growth
and the shadow value of sales. As described above, the intertemporal eect of deep habits
is best captured by variation in t and the price-elasticity eect by changes in the short-
run demand elasticity t. A log-linear approximation of the demand elasticity yields ^t = 
bd=(1  bd) (c^t   c^t 1), which is precisely the second term in the forward solution for ^t.
This way of dissecting ination makes clear how both mechanisms impart inertia. Following
a preference shock, intertemporal eects choke o ination by preventing a collapse in the
11The price elasticity of demand for good i is t(i)    (Pt(i)=Pt)ct(i)
@ct(i)
@(Pt(i)=Pt)
= 
 
ct(i)  bdct 1(i)

=ct(i).
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shadow value of sales. Price-elasticity eects also stamp out ination to the extent that
positive consumption growth in (15) osets any contemporaneous declines in t.
Fig. 3 displays the equilibrium responses to a technology shock. A positive innovation to
zt, all else constant, relaxes the lifetime budget constraint and allows consumption to increase
through a wealth eect channel. Meanwhile, the real interest rate (not shown) temporarily
rises in both models because monetary policy reduces the nominal rate by less than the fall
in expected ination. Higher real rates, in turn, mitigate some of the expansionary eects
on consumption in the short run. Facing only modest growth in consumption demand, the
increase in productivity enables rms to roll back their demand for labor, pushing hours of
work, real wages and marginal cost lower in periods immediately after the shock.12
For reasons made apparent by (13), the decline in real marginal cost has disparate eects
on the shadow value of sales in the two models considered. According to the gure, the
impact-period rise in t under aggregate habits is 12.7% compared to 2.5% under deep
habits. It follows that rms are not as eager to slash prices when habits are deeply rooted.
Indeed, quantitative results show that annualized ination in this case only drops to 2.3%
(down from 3.9%), whereas it plunges to 1.1% under aggregate habits. Thus contrary to a
preference shock, here intertemporal eects help to discourage the large price cuts (instead
of the price hikes) that would otherwise follow an increase in total factor productivity.
Price elasticity eects also inuence the path of ination. Unlike the response depicted
in Fig. 2, however, these eects tend to undermine rather than reinforce the intertempo-
ral eects described above. Because the technology shock leads to a gradual increase in
consumption, short-run demand elasticities in the deep habits model rise and then fall in a
hump-shaped pattern. During periods with high demand elasticities, rms have an incentive
to lower their prices in an eort to capture a bigger share of the market. This actually
intensies the downward pressure on ination and counteracts the upward pull that is being
exerted by the intertemporal eects. The same result can be seen in (15). Technology shocks,
because they increase both t and t, amplify the disination experienced under deep habits.
Yet despite the extra push given by the price-elasticity eect in this case, the intertemporal
eect is evidently strong enough to prevent ination from falling as much as it would if deep
habits were absent from the model altogether.
12In sticky-price models, work hours will contract after an increase in total factor productivity whenever
monetary policy does not fully accommodate the rise in aggregate spending (e.g., Gal and Rabanal, 2004).
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6 Additional Sources of Persistence
Most of the improvements in t associated with the deep habits model come from its ability to
capture the persistence observed in US ination. One could conclude then that the aggregate
habits model is decient simply because it has no internal source of ination persistence other
than serial correlation inherited from preference and technology shocks. But this raises the
possibility that the case for deep habits may not be as compelling if they were evaluated
within the context of larger model that includes plausible alternative sources of persistence.
To help guard against this possibility, I modify the original setup by incorporating two
ad hoc elements capable of generating some persistence irrespective of deep habits. The
rst one borrows from Ireland (2007) by placing a backward-looking term in the adjustment
cost function. Specically, rms are assumed to face quadratic adjustment costs of the
form (=2)

Pt(i)=
 
(%t 1
1 %Pt 1(i)
  12 yt, where % 2 [0; 1] measures the degree to which
lagged ination serves as a reference value for price setting. If % = 1 rms incur costs only
to the extent that growth in Pt(i) deviates from t 1. If % = 0 adjustment costs reduce
to the benchmark case where steady-state ination is the reference point. A log-linear
approximation of the optimal pricing condition produces an augmented Phillips curve
(^t   %^t 1) = Et (^t+1   %^t) + (1=) (c^t   ^t   x^t) : (16)
Ination now has two sources of persistence. One is the persistence inherited from the forcing
variable, c^t  ^t  x^t, and the other is the \built-in" persistence imparted by lagged ination
when % > 0. The second modication allows for serial correlation in the policy shock by
modeling "r;t as an AR(1) process with autoregressive coecient r 2 [0; 1). Due to sticky
prices, greater persistence in the nominal interest rate translates into greater persistence in
consumption. This in turn strengthens ination persistence via the forcing process in (16).
I now re-estimate the nested habits model along with the two restricted versions while
accounting for the additional features described above. Because the maximum-likelihood
procedure is free to select values for % and r, the estimates should help determine whether
the benchmark results falsely attribute ination persistence to deep habits when at least some
of that persistence is actually the result of backward-looking components in the Phillips curve
or serial correlation in the policy shocks. The new estimates are reported in Table 4.
The changes made in this section have little eect on inferences of the nested model or the
deep habits model. In fact, none of the parameter estimates for either model are signicantly
dierent from the original estimates in Table 1. I also nd no evidence of lagged ination
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in the Phillips curve. Estimates of % lie up against the zero lower bound, indicating that
the data prefer to have persistence derive from deep habits rather than backward-looking
frictions in price setting. There is some evidence of serial correlation in the policy shocks.
Estimates of r range from 0.21 to 0.25 and are signicantly dierent from zero.
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Estimates of the aggregate habits model do not exhibit the same level of stability. Im-
posing bd = 0 drives up the estimate of r to 0.66 but pushes down estimates of r and  to
0.31 and 1.17, signaling that the data favor a policy rule with less interest rate smoothing,
a weaker response to ination, and more serial correlation in the shock. Inferences about
habit formation are also aected. The estimate of ba is now 0.79, almost 22% higher than
the corresponding value in Table 1. Despite these parameter changes, the aggregate habits
model still does not attribute any persistence to lagged ination in the Phillips curve. The
point estimate of % is near zero and statistically insignicant.
7 Conclusion
This paper reports estimates from a small-scale new-Keynesian model with habit formation
in consumption. Central to the model is a utility function that nests both aggregate and
deep consumption habits as special cases. Maximum likelihood estimates reveal that the
data prefer an arrangement in which habits over dierentiated products are stronger than
habits over the aggregate nished good. Although separate likelihood ratio tests formally
reject the hypothesis that either type should be excluded (at the 5% level), results show that
the deterioration in model t is far greater when deep habits are missing.
I trace this conclusion to the ability of deep habits to shape the time series properties of
ination in a manner consistent with US data. As argued in the paper, product-level habit
formation motivates rms to smooth out their price adjustments over time. This feature
derives from well-known intertemporal and price-elasticity eects that coalesce with nominal
frictions to produce a model capable of imparting substantial inertia on ination dynamics.
Simulations indicate that deep habits are indeed critical for matching the kind of volatility
and persistence observed in the sample. The same behavior is evident in the impulse response
functions, which show ination reacting sluggishly to preference and technology shocks when
deep habits are preserved but swiftly and less persistent when replaced by aggregate habits.
13The chi-square statistic from a likelihood ratio test of the hypothesis that r = 0 has a p-value of 0.0010
in the nested habits model and 0.0035 in the deep habits model.
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Appendix
A. Symmetric Equilibrium Conditions
at=(xt   baxt 1) = t (A.1)
ht (xt   baxt 1) = wt (A.2)
t = RtEt(t+1=t+1) (A.3)
xt = ct   bdct 1 (A.4)
wt = tzt (A.5)
t = 1  t + bdEt(t+1=t)t+1 (A.6)
ct = txt + (t=   1)(t=)yt   Et(t+1=t)(t+1=   1)(t+1=)yt+1 (A.7)
yt = ztht (A.8)
yt = ct + (=2)(t=   1)2yt (A.9)
log(Rt=R) = r log(Rt 1=R) + (1  r) [ log(t=) + y log(yt=y)] + "r;t (A.10)
log at = a log at 1 + "a;t (A.11)
log zt = (1  z) log z + z log zt 1 + "z;t (A.12)
B. Log-linear Approximation
a^t   (x^t   bax^t 1) =(1  ba) = ^t (B.1)
h^t + (x^t   bax^t 1) =(1  ba) = w^t (B.2)
^t = R^t + Et^t+1   Et^t+1 (B.3)
x^t =
 
c^t   bdc^t 1

=(1  bd) (B.4)
w^t = ^t + z^t (B.5)
^t =  
 
(1  bd)  (1  bd) ^t + bdEt ^t+1   ^t + ^t+1 (B.6)
^t = Et^t+1 + (1=) (c^t   ^t   x^t) (B.7)
y^t = z^t + h^t (B.8)
y^t = c^t (B.9)
R^t = rR^t 1 + (1  r) [^t + yy^t] + "r;t (B.10)
a^t = aa^t 1 + "a;t (B.11)
z^t = z z^t 1 + "z;t (B.12)
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Table 1
Parameter Estimates (1965:Q3 - 2012:Q1)
Model Parameter Nested Deep Aggregate
Parameter Description Habits Habits Habits
a preference shock 0:3006
(0:0575)
0:1229
(0:0170)
0:0224
(0:0065)
z technology shock 0:0114
(0:0026)
0:0162
(0:0059)
0:0164
(0:0034)
r policy shock 0:0017
(0:0001)
0:0017
(0:0001)
0:0020
(0:0001)
a AR preference shock  0:2999
(0:0922)
0:5012
(0:0719)
0:9478
(0:0233)
z AR technology shock 0:9333
(0:0295)
0:8983
(0:0449)
0:9965
(0:0048)
r interest rate smoothing 0:9026
(0:0183)
0:9073
(0:0188)
0:7956
(0:0261)
 ination response 1:5406
(0:3031)
1:4814
(0:3331)
1:4687
(0:1825)
y output response 0:0685
(0:0427)
0:0894
(0:0486)
 0:0155
(0:0131)
ba aggregate habit 0:6111
(0:0546)
0 0:6461
(0:0674)
bd deep habit 0:9438
(0:0069)
0:9414
(0:0077)
0
 Frisch elasticity 2:0135
(0:6603)
1:0655
(0:6334)
1:5749
(0:7689)
 price adjustment cost 59.3778 59.3778 59.3778
 discount factor 0.9965 0.9965 0.9965
 substitution elasticity 6 6 6
 markup 1:2142
(0:0019)
1:2136
(0:0019)
1:2000
(0:0000)
lnL log likelihood 2380:4089 2377:6548 2343:5735
p-value likelihood ratio test   0:0189 0:0000
Notes: The table reports maximum-likelihood estimates of the nested model, the deep habits model (ba = 0), and the aggregate
habits model (bd = 0). Standard errors are in parentheses. Italicized numbers denote values that are imposed prior to estimation.
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Table 2
Standard Deviations
Model SD(c^t) SD(^t) SD(R^t)
Deep Habits 0.0320 0.0075 0.0070
Aggregate Habits 0.0275 0.0172 0.0075
VAR(4) 0.0373 [0.0300, 0.0781] 0.0066 [0.0056, 0.0127] 0.0075 [0.0059, 0.0174]
Notes: Simulations of the deep and aggregate habits models use the same parameter values. Numbers in squared brackets
correspond to 90% condence intervals for the standard deviations implied by an unconstrained VAR(4) on c^t, ^t, and R^t.
Table 3
Variance Decompositions
Deep Habits Aggregate Habits
c^t ^t R^t c^t ^t R^t
preference shock 59.56 11.29 24.36 46.78 65.52 39.36
technology shock 33.98 85.70 54.76 51.47 28.88 54.84
policy shock 6.46 3.01 20.89 1.75 5.61 5.80
Notes: Simulations of the deep and aggregate habits models use the same parameter values. The numbers correspond to the
percentage of the unconditional variances of c^t, ^t, and R^t attributed to each shock.
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Table 4
Parameter Estimates (1965:Q3 - 2012:Q1)
Model Parameter Nested Deep Aggregate
Parameter Description Habits Habits Habits
a preference shock 0:2795
(0:0542)
0:1181
(0:0181)
0:0120
(0:0073)
z technology shock 0:0119
(0:0032)
0:0172
(0:0096)
0:0316
(0:0140)
r policy shock 0:0017
(0:0001)
0:0017
(0:0001)
0:0031
(0:0006)
a AR preference shock  0:3007
(0:0926)
0:4919
(0:0748)
0:9651
(0:0182)
z AR technology shock 0:9273
(0:0345)
0:8866
(0:0663)
0:9956
(0:0060)
r AR policy shock 0:2488
(0:0756)
0:2143
(0:0726)
0:6626
(0:0503)
r interest rate smoothing 0:8790
(0:0243)
0:8911
(0:0243)
0:3062
(0:1166)
 ination response 1:3909
(0:3014)
1:3251
(0:3895)
1:1683
(0:1436)
y output response 0:0513
(0:0419)
0:0823
(0:0495)
 0:0245
(0:0164)
ba aggregate habit 0:6080
(0:0543)
0 0:7865
(0:0861)
bd deep habit 0:9400
(0:0079)
0:9390
(0:0090)
0
 Frisch elasticity 1:6564
(0:6672)
0:8568
(0:7132)
0:6279
(0:4068)
% lagged ination 6:9e-8
(0:0884)
3:8e-8
(0:0938)
1:2e-7
(0:0463)
 price adjustment cost 59.3778 59.3778 59.3778
 discount factor 0.9965 0.9965 0.9965
 substitution elasticity 6 6 6
 markup 1:2133
(0:0019)
1:2130
(0:0021)
1:2000
(0:0000)
lnL log likelihood 2385:8152 2381:9230 2355:2368
p-value likelihood ratio test   0:0053 0:0000
Notes: The table reports maximum-likelihood estimates of the nested model, the deep habits model (ba = 0), and the aggregate
habits model (bd = 0). Standard errors are in parentheses. Italicized numbers denote values that are imposed prior to estimation.
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Fig. 1. The autocorrelation function for consumption c^t, ination ^t, and the interest rate R^t is drawn for the US data (solid
line), the estimated deep habits model (dashed line), and an aggregate habits model (dotted line) that uses the same parameter
values. Correlations for the US data are obtained from a VAR(4), and the shaded areas correspond to 90% condence bands.
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Fig. 2. Impulse responses to a preference shock are drawn for the estimated deep habits model (solid line) and an aggregate
habits model (dotted line) that uses the same parameter values. Ination and the nominal interest rate are measured in
annualized percentage points. All other variables are expressed as percent deviations from the steady state.
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Fig. 3. Impulse responses to a technology shock are drawn for the estimated deep habits model (solid line) and an aggregate
habits model (dotted line) that uses the same parameter values. Ination and the nominal interest rate are measured in
annualized percentage points. All other variables are expressed as percent deviations from the steady state.
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